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THE YEARS OF THE KUOMINTANG: REVOLUTION vs. REACTION

by

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

THE key to political events in China during the past decade lies in the struggle between opposing economic groups for the control of the Kuomintang (Nationalist party). On the outcome of this struggle has rested a choice as to whether the Chinese radicals would be able to utilize the party machinery to construct "a socialistic state" or whether the Chinese conservatives would utilize it to further "a capitalist development." During the earlier years of the decade the radicals were in the ascendant; since the middle of 1927, however, the conservatives have dominated the Kuomintang.

This conflict has been waged against a background of intense economic privation for the mass of the Chinese people. Poverty in the rural areas, resulting in the first instance from the pressure of population upon the available resources, has been enhanced by the toll exacted from the farmer for essential services. "The peasant farmer," declares Dr. Condliffe, "is exploited and even robbed at every turn. For the service of government he pays excessive taxes for little return; for the service of marketing he is again mulcted in excessive sums . . . ; for the provision of credit his need is so great that the prices he must pay are calamitous; and even for the right to use land he must in many cases pay a rent which seems unreasonably high" A similar situation prevails among the urban workers, involving "abuses of the labor of women and children," "wretched sanitary, safety and health conditions" in many workshops, "extremely low" wages, and long hours of work.³ Sun Yat-sen included the need of a remedy for such conditions among his three major objectives,⁴ which he sought to attain through the instrumentality of the Kuomintang.

Six years ago, in 1926 and 1927, the Kuo-

mintang was the most vital political force in China. Its armies were sweeping northward from Canton in an irresistible advance. Its policies were generating a popular enthusiasm for the Nationalist cause never previously exhibited. The possibility of revolutionary social changes was stirring Chinese society to its depths. Drastic internal reforms, especially in social and economic relationships, were being rapidly and easily achieved. A frontal attack was being made on the entrenched position held by the privileged foreigners, and the imperialist powers were on the defensive. This situation no longer holds true. The position of the Kuomintang, especially during the past year, has been increasingly undermined. This result is evident not only in the expanding influence of the Communist movement, which has made steady gains in China's agrarian hinterland;⁵ it is also reflected in a general loss of public confidence in the Kuomintang, as witnessed by student agitations, strikes, and criticisms of the intelligentsia directed against the leaders and policies of the Nanking government. Under this assault the left and right wings of the Kuomintang—formerly quite distinct—have drawn so closely together as to become practically indistinguishable, except for a radical minority led by Madame Sun Yat-sen.⁶ The change that has come over the Kuomintang in these respects constitutes the central phenomenon of Chinese politics. This report seeks to analyze the forces responsible for the rise and fall of Kuomintang prestige during the past decade.

5. An issue of *Foreign Policy Reports* on the Chinese Communist movement is now in preparation.

6. Madame Sun Yat-sen is the widow of China's famous revolutionary leader. This relationship, combined with her unusual charm and ability, has given Madame Sun a unique position in Chinese public life. Although a member of the Soong family which has controlled the Nanking government, she has consistently refused to associate herself with the latter either officially or unofficially, despite extreme family pressure. Instead, she has repeatedly issued statements declaring that the Kuomintang has departed from the revolutionary path outlined by Sun Yat-sen.

7. In 1919-1920, while the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty was still fresh in Chinese minds, the Soviet Union had proposed to relinquish its share in the Boxer Indemnity and its concessions and extraterritorial rights in China. These pledges were fulfilled in the Soviet-Chinese treaties of 1924, negotiated on a basis of mutual equality.

1. Cf. J. B. Condliffe, *China To-Day: Economic* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1932), p. 71-72.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 33-34; for statistics and factual materials, cf. Chapters II and III.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

4. Expressed in Sun Yat-sen's "three principles of the people," the last of which—*min sheng chu i*—means the "principle of the people's livelihood," commonly phrased by Sun himself as "socialism."

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THE REVOLUTIONARY KUOMINTANG, 1923-1927

Ten years ago, after meeting with rebuffs from several Western powers, Sun Yat-sen decided to accept the aid of the Soviet Union in furthering the Chinese nationalist cause.⁷ Almost unnoticed at the time, this act later proved to be the decisive factor in raising the Kuomintang to national preeminence. The Nationalist party's Soviet orientation had its immediate origin⁸ in a series of conferences held at Shanghai early in 1923 between Sun Yat-sen and Adolf Joffe, head of a Soviet mission to China. The resulting joint manifesto, issued on January 26, 1923, established the basic principles of the Kuomintang-Soviet entente. In this declaration, Sun and Joffe agreed that "the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism." M. Joffe further declared "that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve unification and attain full national independence," in the accomplishment of which "China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia."⁹ During the ensuing summer, Chiang Kai-shek spent six months in Russia as Sun Yat-sen's agent, studying the Soviet system at first hand. His favorable report clinched the case for cooperation with the Soviet Union.¹⁰ In September 1923 Michael Borodin arrived at Canton, where he was shortly appointed high adviser to the Kuomintang. Within a few weeks he was in the thick of the organizational activities which resulted in a party rebirth that made the Kuomintang a vital agent of social change in China.

PARTY REORGANIZATION AT CANTON

Borodin was confronted with the most discouraging conditions at Canton. Except for a loose tie of allegiance to Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang leadership lacked unity of outlook and purpose, and was therefore incapable of developing a concrete program of constructive action. Recruited chiefly from the middle class, the party membership had struck no roots in the life of the Chinese masses, although Sun himself was concerned for the people's welfare.¹¹ For its military support, the Kuomintang was dependent upon opportunistic militarists who aided Sun Yat-sen when they wished to cloak their ul-

terior designs with the mantle of his name and prestige. Since Yuan Shih-kai's fall in 1915, Sun Yat-sen had often been debarred by local militarists from occupying the seat of his "provisional" government at Canton. Kwangtung province, like other Chinese provinces, was scourged by the tyranny and exactions of its military overlords.

Working with the cordial assistance of Sun Yat-sen, Borodin immediately attacked the twin problems of creating a unified party organization and of focusing its activity upon specific objectives. The first difficulty was met by a drastic reorganization of the party machinery on the Soviet model. Authority was concentrated in a Central Executive Committee, responsible to a National Congress of party delegates meeting biennially. A new registration of the party membership was effected, and a strict system of discipline introduced. Thus the double aim was served of making every member "conscious, active and responsible,"¹² and of creating a centralized party machine controlled by a few responsible leaders.¹³ By January 1924 the reorganization was sufficiently advanced to permit the summoning of the first National Congress for the consideration of a party program. Outlined chiefly by Borodin, this new Kuomintang platform was built around three policies accepted by Sun Yat-sen: cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist party, anti-imperialism, and a workers' and peasants' program.¹⁴ In its details, this declaration of principles was forward-looking, yet concretely adapted to Chinese conditions. It appealed to the left wing of the Kuomintang, but was by no means Communistic.

During the succeeding two years, working on this basic foundation, the Kuomintang developed into an aggressive political organization which succeeded in effecting a remarkable transformation at Canton and throughout Kwangtung province. This development proceeded along three parallel lines: consolidation of a unified party authority, building up mass support of and participation in party activities, and organization of a Kuomintang military force under party control.

It has been already noted that Borodin's advanced policy appealed particularly to the more radical leaders of the Kuomintang. The members of the left wing, however, were themselves largely representative of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie, chiefly small traders, money-lenders, and landlords.¹⁵ De-

8. Sun Yat-sen records conversations with Russian revolutionaries during his sojourns in Europe, where it is likely that he conferred with Lenin and other Russian leaders in pre-war years. Cf. T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 130-131. Sun also congratulated Lenin on the success of the Russian revolution in a cable from Shanghai in 1918.

9. Tang Leang-Li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1930), p. 156.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

11. At this time the Chinese Communist party consisted of only a few intellectuals, with a handful of student and worker followers.

12. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (New York, Cape & Smith, 1930), Vol. II, p. 638.

13. In practice, these leaders constituted the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee.

14. Cf. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, cited, Vol. II, p. 638-640.

15. Cf. Joseph Barnes and Frederick V. Field, *Behind the Far Eastern Conflict* (New York, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933), p. 28-29.

voted to the achievement of a national democratic régime, they nevertheless shrank from the concrete application of their principles where the economic interests of their class were immediately affected. This latter factor was to prove of decisive importance at the turning-point of the Chinese revolution in the spring of 1927.¹⁶ Opposed to the radicals was the party's right wing, made up of leaders drawn chiefly from the ranks of the newly-developed Chinese capitalists of the great port cities, especially Shanghai. The Kuomintang conservatives were anxious to have a strong centralized government set up, capable of curbing Chinese militarism, of establishing and maintaining "law and order," and of developing an efficient and modernized administration. They were unalterably opposed to the organization of the workers and peasants along radical lines.

While Sun Yat-sen was alive, these opposing wings of the party maintained a quasi-cooperation at Canton, despite grumblings of the conservatives over the leftward tendency of the 1924 reorganization. After Sun's death in March 1925, however, many of the right wing leaders left Canton for the north, where they denounced the "Bolshevization" of the party and eventually set up a rival organization at Shanghai. For the ensuing year, until March 1926, party control at Canton rested in the hands of a left Kuomintang-Communist *bloc*, headed successively by the left wing leaders Liao Chung-kai and Wang Ching-wei. The supremacy of this *bloc* was assured by the mass support of the newly organized workers and peasants of Kwangtung province, and by the new Kuomintang military force established with Soviet aid and commanded by Chiang Kai-shek.

The workers' and peasants' program, outlined by Borodin at the first party congress in 1924, made rapid progress in Kwangtung. It was especially aided by taking shrewd advantage of the opportunities for mass resistance afforded by imperialist provocations in 1925. Under Borodin's inspiration the Chinese Communists took the lead in the laborious effort of building up the peasants' and workers' unions, leaving high party positions to the leading figures of the Kuomintang's left wing. Madame Sun Yat-sen has testified to the decisive importance attached by Dr. Sun to this organization work among the masses.¹⁷ In 1925 the incidents of May 30 at Shanghai and of June 23 at Canton, involving the shooting down of Chinese students and workers by British and French forces, aroused an intense nationalism in China. The anti-imperialist efforts stimulated by these incidents extended the scope of the organizational work among the workers and

peasants, and intensified its effects through cooperative mass action in concrete struggle. Mass protests staged at Shanghai led to the unionization of the factory workers in that city under Communist leadership. At Canton a vast anti-British boycott movement was conducted, paralyzing trade through Hongkong for fifteen months. One hundred thousand Chinese workers withdrew from Hongkong to Canton. The activities of the workers' strike committee powerfully reinforced the Kuomintang régime, aiding it in curbing the Canton bourgeoisie and in extirpating the remnants of the forces of the feudal militarists in Kwangtung province.

For the accomplishment of this latter task, the Kuomintang had for the first time in its history developed a fighting force under its own control. Shortly after Borodin's arrival at Canton, the Whampoa Military Academy for the training of Chinese officers had been established with the aid of Soviet funds and military experts. Revolutionary propaganda tactics formed a regular part of the academic program at Whampoa. The young subalterns turned out by this institution were therefore trained political propagandists as well as military officers, and were animated with self-sacrificing zeal for a revolutionary cause. These factors explain not only the *élan* and fighting morale of the new Kuomintang army units; linked with the party's activities in behalf of the workers and peasants, they also account for the swing of popular sentiment toward the Kuomintang, which cut the ground from under the feet of the opposing feudal militarists. On this basis was founded the party's achievement in ridding Kwangtung province of its militarists within two years, and its more astonishing success in conquering half of China during the succeeding year.

In the military reorganization, close attention was paid to working out measures for insuring civilian political control over the army in order to deprive the generals of their customary exercise of supreme administrative powers. Decisions on all important military matters, including the appointment of high commanding officers, were taken by the Central Executive Committee. A civilian official—T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance—was the army paymaster.¹⁸ The actions of generals in the field were subject to scrutiny by the head of the political department attached to each army, and the various army staffs were each provided with a Soviet military adviser, who reported to Borodin. At Whampoa the work of Commandant Chiang Kai-shek was also super-

18. Through the fiscal reforms made possible by his freedom from arbitrary military exactions, T. V. Soong was able to increase the Kwangtung provincial revenues from less than one million silver dollars a month to nearly six million a month. (Cf. George E. Sokolsky, *China Year Book, 1928*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 1338-1339.)

16. Cf. p. 296-297.

17. Cf. Appendix I.

vised by a political commissar—a post held successively by Liao Chung-kai and Wang Ching-wei, both left wing party leaders.

The outcome showed, however, that even under this system the Kuomintang generals were too well accustomed to regard themselves as masters of the area they occupied and too little wedded to the new social and economic program to subject their actions to the control of the party's political authorities. Chiang Kai-shek proved to be the most vigorous military commander developed at Canton. Despite his visit to Moscow and his apparent "left" conversion, however, Chiang remained most deeply influenced by his earlier associations with Chinese "big business" at Shanghai. From the first he was intolerant of political supervision—a fact demonstrated in the early Kwangtung campaigns. In March 1926, during an absence of Borodin from Canton, Chiang engineered an anti-Communist *coup d'état*. Wang Ching-wei was driven into exile, a number of the Russians were arrested, and negotiations looking toward the end of the boycott were entered into with Hongkong. Chiang's action, while immediately directed toward the elimination of Wang's political supervision, represented a decided swing to the right. In May, when Borodin returned, Chiang reversed his position—driving from Canton some of his rightist colleagues who had just assisted him in the *coup d'état*. Chiang could not afford to dispense with Soviet aid at this juncture, with the northern campaign about to begin. On the other hand, Borodin could not press the issue against Chiang without immediately provoking a disastrous party split, which he was anxious to postpone as long as possible. Preparations were therefore made to mobilize the Kuomintang's forces for the "northern expedition."¹⁹ Chiang Kai-shek had showed his hand, however, and as the northern campaign proceeded the question of when the party split would occur, and with what results, became of paramount importance.

THE PARTY SPLIT

Early in July 1926 the advance guard of the Kuomintang forces, which ultimately totalled some 100,000 men, was launched from Canton against the northern militarists. Chiang Kai-shek, officially the commander-in-chief, personally controlled two army corps of about 20,000 troops; the plan of campaign, however, was directed by fifteen Soviet officers headed by General Galen.²⁰ By late August the Nationalist armies had reached the Yangtze valley; by October Wu

Pei-fu's forces had been routed, and Hankow and the surrounding area were under Kuomintang control. Political propagandists preceded and accompanied the army, scattering handbills and placards, organizing peasants' and workers' unions, and setting up new local governments. The official termination of the Hongkong boycott on October 10, 1926 released new thousands of trained organizers for these political activities. At Hankow the workers offered militant opposition to the local Chinese and foreign capitalist interests. In February and March 1927, the anti-imperialist attack culminated in Sino-British agreements for the rendition of the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang. Eugene Chen, Foreign Minister at Hankow, was acclaimed throughout China. At Shanghai, the center of foreign interests in China, however, thousands of foreign troops were landed in the International Settlement, and preparations were made for stern resistance to the Kuomintang's anti-imperialist program.

Meanwhile, strife within the Kuomintang had progressed to the breaking point. In October 1926 a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, meeting at Canton, had decided to remove the seat of the Nationalist government to Hankow—an act which was officially accomplished on November 10. Under the government's control in the Hankow area were some 65,000 troops. Chiang Kai-shek, however, remained aloof at Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi province, with approximately 35,000 soldiers under his command. There a small nucleus of moderate party leaders gathered around him, and connections were formed with the expelled rightist elements in Shanghai. The immediate capture of Shanghai, an aim which ran directly counter to the party's strategic plans, now became of primary importance to Chiang Kai-shek. He realized that he stood no chance against Borodin and the organized workers at Hankow, and felt the need of support from the merchant-banker class of Shanghai. The Kuomintang's plan of campaign had called for a direct northward push from Hankow toward Peiping (Peking)—a policy which possessed the decisive advantages of effecting an immediate junction with the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang, the party's northern ally, and of postponing the complications certain to arise from contact with the concentrated Sino-foreign capitalist interests at Shanghai. Once Peiping had been captured and control of north China assured, the party could close in on Shanghai at its leisure with a united country behind it. Chiang Kai-shek's initiation of military operations against Shanghai early in 1927 was therefore denounced by Hankow as the action of a counter-revolu-

19. At this time Wang was chairman of the Central Executive Committee and political commissar at Whampoa.

20. Military set-backs suffered by the Kuomintang's allies in southern Hunan province supplied the immediate occasion for the campaign.

21. Cf. H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), Chapter VIII, p. 108-126.

tionary and of a feudal militarist who was asserting his will over that of the regularly constituted civilian political authorities of the party. To these strictures Chiang retorted that the Hankow government, dominated by a left Kuomintang-Communist *bloc* under Soviet influence, had forfeited the allegiance of party members. The Central Executive Committee, meeting at Hankow on March 10, 1927, demoted Chiang Kai-shek from the post of commander-in-chief, which was replaced by a civilian military commission. Wang Ching-wei, who was then returning from his European exile, was reappointed to the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee. A final break was postponed, however, by retaining Chiang as head of the first Nationalist army and as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

The intra-party strife entered a new and more acute stage on March 22, when Chiang Kai-shek's troops occupied the Chinese sections of Shanghai. Strike demonstrations by the organized radical workers, directed by wireless from Hankow, had lasted intermittently in Shanghai since the middle of February. Several days before the arrival of Chiang's soldiers, the unions' strike committee had actually seized control of the Chinese city, which was taken over from the workers by a small advance guard of less than 500 Nationalist troops.²² Chiang Kai-shek himself entered the city on March 26, and at once set about the task of suppressing the activities of the unions. The Shanghai Chinese Bankers Association arranged for an immediate loan of thirty million dollars silver to be used by Chiang Kai-shek in setting up an anti-Hankow government at Nanking.²³ Chiang's efforts in this direction were furthered by the anti-Communist outcry resulting from the capture and looting of Nanking and the murder of six foreigners there by Hankow troops on March 24. Within two weeks he had gained effective control of the Shanghai-Nanking area. Early in April he utilized the Shanghai secret societies,²⁴ with which he had contracted intimate relations during his earlier career, to smash the radical unions by a ruthless massacre of the Shanghai workers.²⁵ The police of the French Concession, the authorities of which immediately recognized in Chiang Kai-shek a new and powerful ally of the foreign business interests, cooperated in this work

of restoring "law and order" in Shanghai.²⁶ The suppression of the radical mass movement proceeded parallel with the organization of the Nanking government, which was formally inaugurated on April 18, 1927. It was set up under the aegis of a "purified" Kuomintang, purged of its Communist and left wing elements. The composition of this reorganized party was wholly conservative, comprising the Kuomintang moderates who had rallied to the support of Chiang Kai-shek, members of the previously expelled right wing, and new bourgeois elements formerly unconnected with the party. The cult of Sunyatsenism, as developed by this group, was robbed of the social revolutionary implications of Sun's original principles.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the Central Executive Committee—the legal governing body of the Kuomintang—still adhered to the left wing régime at Hankow. On April 17, under the chairmanship of Wang Ching-wei, the Committee issued a lengthy manifesto, scathingly denouncing Chiang Kai-shek and his associates in the Nanking *coup d'état* as traitors to the Kuomintang,²⁷ and expelling them from the party. From this time on, however, difficulties multiplied for the Hankow régime. Pushing their northward offensive into Honan province, the Hankow Nationalists won their last great military victory. In a three-day battle near Chumatien at the end of May, the well-equipped and well-trained forces of Chang Tso-lin were decisively defeated. Feng Yuxiang, however, who had cooperated with the Kuomintang forces to only a limited extent in this struggle, now established himself in Honan at the strategic railway junction of Chengchow, where he became the arbiter between Hankow and Nanking. The Honan fighting, moreover, had been the severest of the entire campaign, decimating many of the most militant of the original Kuomintang army corps still under Hankow's control. As a result, the feudal military elements, which had been incorporated into the Kuomintang armies during the northern advance without having undergone the disciplinary nationalist training at Canton, acquired a dominating influence at Hankow. Increasingly they pressed the left wing party leaders to repudiate the radical activities of the newly-organized unions, particularly those of the peasants in Hunan and Hupeh provinces. These leaders were themselves beginning to be concerned over such activities, especially since the peasants' measures against the landlords and usurious money-lenders of inland China were directed against the class to which they for the most part belonged.²⁸ Sporadic acts

22. Sokolsky, *China Year Book*, 1928, cited, p. 1355-1356.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 1361.

24. These societies consisted of the racketeering gangsters of Shanghai, who specialized in the profitable enterprises of opium-selling, kidnapping, and prostitution. (*Ibid.*, p. 1377.)

25. *Ibid.*, p. 1362, 1374-75; also *idem*, *The Tinder Box of Asia* (New York, Doubleday Doran, 1932), p. 45. This "white terror" was extended to the rest of the area under Chiang's control, where it was applied indiscriminately, resulting in the deaths of numerous innocent victims. It has been continuously utilized as a weapon of repression by the Nanking régime.

26. The authorities of the International Settlement, slower to understand the meaning and character of this particular movement, cooperated to only a limited extent. (*Ibid.*, p. 1362.)

27. For text of this manifesto, cf. *ibid.*, p. 1367-1370.

28. Cf. p. 294.

of peasant suppression began to occur under subordinate military commanders in Hunan province. In June, at a conference held in Chengchow, the Hankow leaders capitulated to Feng Yu-hsiang's demand for a general suppression of the mass movement. At this time, also, Borodin was struggling against intense pressure from the ultra-left Trotskyists at Moscow, who were urging the setting up of a strict Communist régime at Hankow based on an armed force of workers and peasants.²⁹ By the end of July this pressure had become so great that Borodin felt himself disavowed by Moscow; and on July 27, despite pleadings of the left wing Kuomintang leaders,³⁰ he left Hankow and set out on the hazardous return journey through Mongolia to Russia.³¹

Shortly after Borodin's departure, the Chinese Communists carried out a successful revolt in Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironsides"

THE NANKING REGIME, 1927-1932

The forces that have exerted dominant influence over the policies and activities of the Nanking government, during the five years of its existence, have been those that were instrumental in its formation. In general, the Nanking régime represented a reaction against a revolutionary Kuomintang, as expressed in the Soviet alliance and in a radical mass movement. Its most powerful supporters have been the Shanghai bankers, who have generously subscribed to a continuous series of government loans. This domestic financial backing has had great advantages. It largely accounts for Nanking's achievement in maintaining, without resort to foreign loans, the longest-continued Chinese

—one of the crack Kuomintang army corps. The action would never have been countenanced by Borodin; its results were as he had foreseen.³² It split the "Ironsides"—10,000 troops going with Chang Fa-kuei, and 15,000 with the Chinese Communist party.³³ It also dispersed the Kuomintang left wing: some of its members joined Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking; others went into exile in Europe; still others, including Madame Sun Yat-sen and Eugene Chen, went to Moscow. The revolutionary phase of the Kuomintang had now ended. Counter-revolution ruled under the Hankow generals in the central Yangtze valley, as it did under Chiang Kai-shek in the lower Yangtze areas. The revolution's obituary was penned by Madame Sun Yat-sen in a statement issued at Hankow on July 27, 1927 just prior to her departure from China. (Cf. Appendix I.³⁴)

government since 1912. At the same time, it has smoothed the path of Nanking's relationships with the Western powers, thus laying the basis for the rendition of foreign rights and privileges through the legal channels of peaceful diplomatic procedure.

On the other hand, the Nanking government has suffered definite disadvantages from relying chiefly on the support of the Shanghai bourgeoisie. The objectives of the latter included the suppression of radical labor and peasant movements, the establishment of a strong centralized government capable of stamping out militarism, and the abolition of imperialistic rights and privileges. The acceptance of the first of these objectives involved the rejection of Sun Yat-sen's basic principle of social revolution. In jettisoning this principle, the Nanking régime jeopardized the achievement of the other two objectives, since organized mass action had supplied the most potent weapon for curbing the militarists and overthrowing the imperialistic system in China.

Without the support of an organized mass movement, the civilian political leaders of the Kuomintang became mere dependents of the military powers at Nanking and elsewhere in China. Chiang Kai-shek's suppression of the mass movement was a recognition that it stood in the way of his achievement of supreme military power. With its suppression, however, the various Kuomintang generals—and all but a few of the Chinese generals now joined the party—constituted a new set of militarists, who have themselves engaged in a further succession of civil wars since 1929. This result illustrates the change that came over the spirit of the Kuomintang with the loss of its radical allies. The organized city workers, the Communist peas-

29. Throughout his activities in China, Borodin had been hampered by conflicting instructions from Moscow. On the whole, he had adhered to the policy of assisting the Chinese leaders to achieve a national revolution, such as that pledged by Sun Yat-sen and Adolf Joffe (cf. p. 293), taking care only that an adequate basis should be laid through a strongly organized mass movement. In this policy, Borodin had received the support of Stalin. The Trotskyists, however, had from the beginning urged the immediate arming of the unionized workers, dissociation from the Kuomintang, and the setting up of an undisguised Communist régime. Both at Canton and Hankow, Borodin rejected this ultra-left policy as premature and impractical.

30. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, cited, p. 676. This interpretation tones down the orthodox view that the left wing drove out Borodin as a result of the disclosure of Comintern orders instructing him to arm the masses and set up a Communist régime. (Cf. Sokolsky, *China Year Book*, 1928, cited, p. 1371.)

31. For the story of Borodin's Mongolian journey, as well as the achievements of the peasant-worker movement in the Hankow area, cf. Anna Louise Strong, *China's Millions* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1928).

32. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, cited, p. 677. Trotsky, however, contends that Borodin's "compromisist" collaboration with the Kuomintang inevitably led to the debacle. Cf. *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1932), Vol. III, p. 52-58; also *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, Pioneer Publishers, 1932).

33. These Communist forces, under Generals Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, moved southward, met with reverses at Swatow, staged an abortive *coup d'état* at Canton in December, and eventually withdrew into the southeastern mountains, where they formed the nucleus of the present Chinese Communist movement.

34. This statement was at once recognized as an uncompromising challenge to the new Kuomintang régime that Chiang Kai-shek was forming at Nanking. Its circulation was prohibited and, so far as possible, it was suppressed.

ant unions, and the radical student movement, which had supplied the party with its revolutionary zeal and initiative, were now ranked as its opponents. With their departure from the Kuomintang, the party lost a measure of morale and enthusiasm which it has never regained.

The anti-imperialist struggle also suffered from Nanking's efforts to suppress radical activities. Where previously the Kuomintang and the Communists had presented a united front against the imperialist powers, they now frittered away their energies in a devastating internecine struggle which reached down into the workers' union, out into the revolting peasant areas, and also into the university classroom. By vesting the control and direction of the anti-imperialist struggle in the hands of the Chinese bourgeoisie, moreover, the nature and aims of that struggle were considerably modified. Though the Shanghai capitalist was better able to secure voluntary concessions from the Western powers, he was less able to carry on an uncompromising struggle against them. In certain important respects, especially in the desire to curb radical movements, the aims of the Chinese and foreign business interests coincided.³⁵ The Nanking régime has therefore not been averse to accepting the help of the police of the French Concession and the International Settlement at Shanghai in rounding up agitators, or the aid of foreign gunboats in Chinese waters against the Communists. Foreign military and financial advisers were sought in the United States, England or France instead of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances of partial collaboration with the Western powers, which—aside from Japan—constitute the vested imperialists in China, the struggle to abolish foreign privileges lost its uncompromising character.

The results of this re-orientation of the Kuomintang's domestic and foreign policies under the Nanking régime have become more evident since the launching of Japan's attack on Manchuria in 1931. Rivalries among the various Kuomintang generals have prevented the formation of a united military front against Japan, both at Shanghai and in north China.³⁶ Chiang Kai-shek's major military operations in 1932 were directed against the Communists. At Shang-

hai, moreover, the Japanese forces utilized the International Settlement as a base of military operations against China without effective protest from the Western powers. The Nanking government has sought help from the League of Nations without success, and has finally resumed relations with the Soviet Union.³⁷ Concentrated at the moment on its internal problems, however, the Soviet Union is not anxious to project itself into the Sino-Japanese dispute. Vigorous Soviet aid, in any case, could be expected only by a Kuomintang régime that espoused the interests of the Chinese peasants and workers.

POLITICAL RIVALRIES

A survey of the political history of the Kuomintang during the past five years reads much like that of the warlord period in China from 1915 to 1925. There is the same confusion of rival generals, of attacks and counter-attacks, of military campaigns with no apparent results, and the same lack of clearly defined goals. Certain outward contrasts may be noted, but they do not alter the basic similarity. Throughout these years a single administration has held office at Nanking with surprisingly few changes in personnel. For most of this period, Chiang Kai-shek has held the post of chairman of the State Council—an office corresponding to the presidency of the republic. This position, coupled with his continued occupation of the seat of central government, has enabled him to stigmatize his military rivals as rebels against the ideals of "centralization" and "progressive nationalism" represented by Nanking. His opponents, in turn, have denounced Chiang as a party dictator, and have come forward as defenders of the "democratization of the party." The emptiness of such slogans illustrates the paucity of genuine differences of opinion or outlook between the contending factions,³⁸ all of which have been united on a conservative platform. As a result, the losses of civil strife—the lives sacrificed, the immense sums squandered, and the widespread destruction involved—have been suffered for no adequate purpose and so without corresponding gains.

Political developments since the middle of 1927 may be summarized under four main heads: the formative period ending with the official inauguration of the National Government in October 1928; the struggle with Feng Yu-hsiang in 1929-1930; the Canton-Nanking split in 1931; and the attempt to set up a coalition government of the various party factions in 1932.

The suppression of the mass movement by

35. In this connection Leon Trotsky writes that the "bourgeoisie of backward countries from the days of its milk teeth grows up as an agency of foreign capital, and notwithstanding its envious hatred of foreign capital, always does and always will in every decisive situation turn up in the same camp with it. Chinese compradorism is the classic form of the colonial bourgeoisie, and the Kuomintang is the classic party of compradorism." (*The History of the Russian Revolution*, cited, Vol. III, p. 55-56.)

36. When the pressure of public opinion could no longer be withstood, Chiang Kai-shek finally sent two divisions of untrained troops to assist the Nineteenth Route Army at Shanghai. At present, also, both Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang hesitate to embark on an active defense of north China unless compelled by popular pressure.

37. The resumption of Soviet-Chinese diplomatic relations was announced at Geneva on December 12, 1932. (Cf. *New York Times*, December 13, 1932.) The Nanking government originally broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on December 14, 1927, following the Communist uprising at Canton. (Cf. p. 297, note 33.)

38. Cf. Appendix III.

the Kuomintang generals at Hankow in the summer of 1927 smoothed the path to a reconciliation with the Nanking régime. Conversations were at once initiated between the Hankow and Nanking factions in an effort to work out some basis of cooperation. In order to further the progress of this movement, Chiang Kai-shek resigned from his posts in August and went to Japan. He took care to leave his subordinate generals in strategic positions, however, and in November he returned and once more assumed his dominant position in party councils. During succeeding months, a steady series of conferences among the various Kuomintang leaders gradually established a governing personnel at Nanking more representative of the party as a whole. The general orientation, nevertheless, remained definitely conservative, with the more radical left wing leaders almost entirely excluded from the government. Wang Ching-wei went into an exile which alternated with periods of active opposition to the Nanking régime until early in 1932. T. V. Soong and Sun Fo, both of whom were at this time united to Chiang Kai-shek by the ties of family relationship,³⁹ proved the outstanding exceptions to this alienation of the left wing.

By the spring of 1928, the Nanking government was in a position to offer military support to Yen Hsi-shan, the "model governor" of Shansi province, whose forces had been fighting Chang Tso-lin since the preceding autumn. Early in June, following Nationalist successes in Shantung leading to clashes with Japanese troops which held up Chiang Kai-shek's advance, Peiping was captured by the allied forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. The resulting unification of the country under Kuomintang generals, all of whom paid at least nominal allegiance to Nanking, paved the way for a definitive reorganization of the Nanking government. Under an organic law promulgated on October 4, the new National Government of China was formally inaugurated on October 10, 1928. The process of unification was completed on December 29 by the adherence of Chang Hsueh-liang, who had assumed control in Manchuria following the death of his father, Chang Tso-lin, in the preceding June.⁴⁰

The unification thus achieved, however, was more nominal than real. Actually, the Nanking régime constituted a loose federa-

tion of regional militarists,⁴¹ several of whom had been very slightly influenced by the Kuomintang ideology. Six of these regional groups stood out prominently at the beginning of 1929.⁴² Li Chi-shen ruled at Canton; Chiang Kai-shek controlled the lower Yangtze valley; the forces of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, later known as the "Kwangsi militarists," dominated the Hankow area; Feng Yu-hsiang occupied Honan and Shensi provinces; Yen Hsi-shan controlled north China; and Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, was supreme in Manchuria. These various Kuomintang warlords have since engaged in four years (1929-1932) of political maneuvering and military struggle.

The period opened with a constructive move—an effort to secure through mutual agreement a horizontal reduction of the regional armies. Troop disbandment under the quotas proposed, however, would have rebounded to the advantage of Chiang Kai-shek. The regional leaders did not feel that their representation in the Nanking régime was strong enough to permit of its military dominance. Suspicion was increased when the Third National Kuomintang Congress, which convened at Nanking on March 15, 1929, was packed with Chiang Kai-shek's adherents. Meanwhile, warfare had already broken out in the Hankow area between Nanking and the Kwangsi faction. The latter were decisively defeated by Chiang Kai-shek's forces in a rapid campaign that ended early in April. Their Cantonese ally, Li Chi-shen, who had entered Nanking for purposes of mediation on a guarantee of immunity, was summarily arrested by Chiang Kai-shek, and pro-Nanking forces secured control of Kwangtung province. As a result of this struggle, therefore, Nanking extended its authority over the Hankow and Canton areas. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi entrenched themselves in Kwangsi province, which they henceforth controlled.⁴³

Chiang Kai-shek was now free to devote his attention to Feng Yu-hsiang—a much more formidable rival.⁴⁴ Despite Feng's well-disciplined army, his position in Honan and Shensi provinces was subject to various handicaps. The revenues derived from this area were small—a condition aggravated by the famine prevailing in Shensi. Above all, he lacked access to a seaport, through which he could secure munitions and supplies. It was alleged that Chiang Kai-shek, under stress of the Hankow struggle, had agreed to permit Feng's forces to occupy Shantung province, with its port of Tsingtao. If any such agreement existed, it was set aside in

39. On December 1, 1927 Chiang Kai-shek married Soong Mei-ling, a sister of T. V. Soong. A second of the Soong sisters was the wife of Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor at Nanking; and a third was Madame Sun Yat-sen, who was also the stepmother of Sun Fo, Minister of Railways. These complicated interrelationships within the Nanking régime led its opponents to label it the "Soong Dynasty."

40. For a detailed treatment of the events summarized in this paragraph, cf. T. A. Bisson, "The Nanking Government," *Foreign Policy Association, Information Service*, Vol. V, No. 17, October 30, 1929, p. 296-304.

41. A fact clearly revealed in the basic law promulgated on October 4, 1928. Cf. Edward S. Corwin, "Some Observations on the Organic Law," *China Tomorrow*, December 20, 1928.

42. Bisson, "The Nanking Government," cited, p. 304-305.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 305-306.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 306-307.

mid-April, when Nanking requested the Japanese troops to delay their evacuation and then parceled out Shantung among three generals, only one of whom was Feng's adherent. A crisis verging on war between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek at once ensued, but open hostilities were averted through the summer of 1929. During this lull, the body of Sun Yat-sen was interred in the imposing mausoleum erected on Purple Mountain at Nanking. Madame Sun Yat-sen returned to China for the interment ceremonies, following which she went into seclusion at Shanghai despite intense pressure to induce her to join the Nanking régime. (Cf. Appendix II.) In October the long-threatened hostilities broke out between Chiang and Feng.⁴⁵ The results of this struggle, although favorable to Chiang Kai-shek, were on the whole inconclusive.⁴⁶ Its most significant outcome was the increased measure of cooperation that now developed between Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, the Shansi governor. The latter, who had at first attempted to remain neutral, was by this time convinced that Feng's elimination would mean his own eventual downfall.

Preparations for the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and the Yen-Feng coalition, which was now seen to be inevitable, were pushed forward during the winter of 1929-1930. Late in March 1930, Yen Hsi-shan ousted Nanking's officials from the Peiping-Tientsin area, and early in April the conflict was ushered in by denunciatory manifestoes from both sides.⁴⁷ Heavy fighting began in May and lasted for five months. Success first favored the Yen-Feng coalition, which captured Tsinan, the capital of Shantung province, on June 25.⁴⁸ The superior financial resources of Nanking, however, which gave it decided advantages in munitions and equipment, at length prevailed. Tsinan was recaptured on August 15 in the course of a battle which virtually eliminated the Shansi troops as a fighting force.⁴⁹ The intervention of Chang Hsueh-liang's Manchurian forces, which occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area on September 19-20, proved the decisive factor. The troops of Yen and Feng, who temporarily withdrew from public life, were largely incorporated into the armies of the two great remaining military powers—Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang.

The action of Wang Ching-wei and Chen Kung-po, most prominent of the left wing Kuomintang irreconcilables, in joining a

short-lived Peiping government, set up on September 9, 1930 with Yen Hsi-shan at its head, constituted the most significant aspect of the Yen-Feng rebellion. Lengthy statements issued by Wang and Chen at Peiping during the summer of 1930 presented a detailed summary of left wing policies. They indicated a desire to modify but not to alter in any essential the policies already enforced by Nanking. As elaborated by Chen Kung-po, the left wing platform denied the practicability of communism in China, advocated the equal protection of capital and labor, and urged the necessity of an evolutionary transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.⁵⁰ This statement was reenforced on July 28 by Wang Ching-wei, who declared that the first task of the new government in Peiping would be to undertake a campaign for the suppression of bandits and Communists throughout the country.⁵¹ He favored resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia—not a return to "the old relations of a close imitation" of the Soviet Union but a renewal of "political, social, and trade intercourse."⁵² Political reforms were stressed in a manifesto advocating the establishment of "genuine democratic government" through the drafting of a bill of rights, training of the people in the exercise of their political rights but not in class conflict, and enforcing a strict demarcation between party activities and government affairs.⁵³ The economic and financial program outlined by Wang Ching-wei differed in no essential from that of Nanking.⁵⁴ Chiang Kai-shek's propaganda corps strenuously attempted to pin the Communist label on Wang Ching-wei and his associates at Peiping in 1930. Judging from these pronouncements, however, the earlier radicalism of the left wing leaders had softened to a mild reformist liberalism, far removed from Communism.

The end of 1930 was marked by a growing *rapprochement* between Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang. On the strength of the military predominance of this new alliance, it was hoped that the era of civil strife would be replaced by a period of peaceful reconstructive activity. Early in 1931, however, long-existing differences between some of the Nanking leaders, particularly Hu Han-min and Chiang Kai-shek, rapidly culminated in an explosive outburst. The surface issues in this struggle were many and complicated, involving League activities in China, the opium problem, constitutional reform, the proposed American silver loan, and

45. *Ibid.*, p. 295-296; also T. A. Bisson, "Reconstruction in China," Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. V, No. 23, January 22, 1930, p. 434-435.

46. Cf. "War in China," Foreign Policy Association News Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 5, December 6, 1929.

47. *The Week in China*, March 22, 1930, p. 328; April 5, 1930, p. 369-371; also *China Weekly Review*, April 5, 1930, p. 207-209; April 12, 1930, p. 241-243.

48. *China Weekly Review*, June 28, 1930, p. 129.

49. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1930, p. 440.

50. *The Week in China*, July 19, 1930, p. 727-736.

51. *Ibid.*, August 2, 1930, p. 790-791.

52. *China Weekly Review*, August 2, 1930, p. 322.

53. *The Week in China*, August 9, 1930, p. 796-803. In view of Wang Ching-wei's association with Chiang Kai-shek in the Nanking régime in 1932, it is interesting to note the epithets of "traitor," "arch-criminal," and "enemy of the people" applied to the latter in this manifesto.

54. *Ibid.*, September 6, 1930, p. 863-869.

the setting up of a national economic council.^{54a} The basic issue was simple, revolving around the extent and nature of Chiang Kai-shek's control at Nanking, especially in connection with the constitutional changes proposed for adoption at the National People's Convention summoned for May 5, 1931. The preliminary skirmishes ended with Chiang Kai-shek's summary arrest of Hu Han-min, who joined Li Chi-shen under detention at Tangshan, Nanking's asylum for political prisoners. In this case, however, Chiang Kai-shek had under-estimated the extent of the reaction to his arbitrary procedure. The signal for revolt was given at Canton, where a *coup d'état* led by General Chen Chi-tang overthrew Nanking's control of Kwangtung province in April. Wang Ching-wei and Eugene Chen, of the left wing, joined the new Canton régime, which also contracted an alliance with the Kwangsi faction. A number of the Nanking leaders, including Sun Fo, withdrew from the government and proceeded to Canton, where a "provisional revolutionary government of south China" was set up early in May. Despite these defections, the Nanking régime carried through the National People's Convention, which was packed with Chiang Kai-shek's adherents. A new "provisional constitution," approved by the convention on May 12, enlarged the authority of the Chairman of the State Council—a post held by Chiang Kai-shek—by empowering him to select the chairmen of the five Yuans, all Cabinet ministers, and the chairmen of all government commissions.⁵⁵

Despite the practically dictatorial powers thus vested in Chiang Kai-shek, the Nanking régime, weakened by the loss of the influential party leaders that had gone over to Canton, was less than ever representative of the Kuomintang.⁵⁶ A choice had to be made between the renewal of military struggle for party supremacy and the arrangement of a peaceful *modus vivendi* between Nanking and Canton. Through the summer of 1931 both sides remained on the defensive, but early in September the truce was broken. A "northern expedition" of Kwangtung-Kwangsi forces was set in motion against Nanking, and Chiang Kai-shek made preparations to oppose the advance. The Japanese attack in Manchuria called a halt to these operations, and the concluding months of 1931 were spent in a lengthy series of peace parleys.

Canton's demand for the resignations of Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong constituted the chief obstacle to a settlement, but was

eventually acceded to. In the course of the negotiations Hu Han-min was released, and proceeded to Hongkong.⁵⁷ Early in December a general compromise was effected, whereby government control was vested chiefly in the Canton group, and party authority was concentrated in a standing committee composed of the "big three"—Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei. The personnel of the reorganized government, which was formally inaugurated on January 1, 1932, was "progressive" in character, including Sun Fo as Premier, Eugene Chen as Foreign Minister, and Chen Kung-po as Minister of Labor. In many quarters, and particularly in left wing circles, the success represented by a change of government achieved through political rather than military means was greeted with satisfaction. Madame Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, in a penetrating analysis of the working forces responsible for the coalition, denounced the procedure as a selfish struggle for the spoils of office. (Cf. Appendix III.)

This most comprehensive attempt to set up a general coalition of the various Kuomintang factions culminated in failure within a month. Hu Han-min clung to the safety of his refuge at Hongkong, and the standing committee of the "big three," through which effective cooperation could alone have been achieved, never met. The new government found itself balked at every turn. The treasury was empty, and with the resignation of T. V. Soong, whom the Shanghai bankers trusted, no funds were forthcoming. Similarly, although Chiang Kai-shek had also resigned, his appointee as Minister of War—General Ho Ying-ching—retained effective control over the bulk of Nanking's military forces. These circumstances checkmated Eugene Chen's attempt to introduce a policy of vigorous opposition to Japan, involving the severance of diplomatic relations, which was opposed by both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. As a result, Sun Fo and Eugene Chen resigned their positions on January 25, thus dealing a final blow to the coalition movement.

The downfall of the coalition government paved the way for the return to power of Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. With them was now associated Wang Ching-wei, who succeeded to the chairmanship of the Executive Yuan. The Foreign Ministry was headed by Lo Wen-kan, formerly connected with Chang Tso-lin's Peiping government and now an appointee of Chang Hsueh-liang. Others of the older generation of Chinese diplomats who had served under the northern militarists, such as W. W. Yen and V. K. Wellington Koo, also reappeared as Nan-

54a. Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia*, cited, p. 198-206.

55. For text, cf. *China Weekly Review*, May 23, 1931, p. 422-423.

56. Of the sixteen members of the Central Executive Committee formed at Canton in July 1925, eight were now at Canton, only one was at Nanking, two were dead, and the rest were unaccounted for—probably Communists. (Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia*, cited, p. 204.)

57. Li Chi-shen, who had been arrested in March 1929 (cf. p. 299), was also released at this time.

king's representatives. For some months the new alignment presented a strong front, despite accusations that the national defense was being sabotaged. In August 1932, however, a sharp conflict broke out between Wang Ching-wei and Chang Hsueh-liang, which threatened for a time to disrupt the government. Without resigning his position, Wang Ching-wei eventually left for Europe on a leave of absence to seek medical treatment.

The year 1932 ended under difficult conditions. A fourth major anti-Communist campaign had just been concluded without decisive results. Internecine warfare had raged during the autumn in Szechuen and Shantung provinces. The latter conflict, in particular, had roused grave apprehensions.⁵⁸ It resulted in consolidating the control of General Han Fu-chu, a former subordinate of Feng Yu-hsiang, over Shantung province. At the height of the struggle, Feng Yu-hsiang emerged from his two years' retirement, and for a time it was feared that Feng and Han might attempt to overthrow Chang Hsueh-liang's control of north China. In the south, Chen Chi-tang maintained his control over Canton, despite revolts initiated by Hu Han-min's supporters. Both these factions were hostile to Nanking. The menace of Japanese aggression served to prevent these local conflicts among the Kuomintang factions from assuming major proportions.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REGIME

Defenders of the Nanking government point to a series of achievements which, they claim, justify its title to be considered the most able government that has emerged in China since the establishment of the republic in 1911. As a result of the new series of treaties negotiated with the foreign powers since 1928, China has secured tariff autonomy, enormously increasing its revenues⁵⁹ and enabling it to protect its infant industries. Under the able administration of T. V. Soong, the Nanking government has modernized its financial system, reorganized its tax-collecting agencies, and floated a series of loans on which capital and interest payments have been punctually met.⁶⁰ Foreign concessions at Tientsin, Chinkiang and Amoy, and the leased territory of Weihaiwei, have been restored to Chinese jurisdiction. Vast reconstruction plans for railway and road building, for irrigation and flood-control systems, for education and health reforms have been drafted. Advanced industrial and labor

legislation has been passed, providing for the organization of trade unions, the arbitration of labor disputes, and the eight-hour day.

Critics of the Nanking régime contend that the effect of these alleged achievements has been largely nullified by the continued prevalence of large-scale civil wars. The increased tariff revenues, for example, have been pledged to service domestic loans totaling over \$1,000,000,000 silver, the bulk of which has been expended for purposes of warfare. For years to come, therefore, customs and other tax revenues must continue to be used for the payment of the wars waged by Nanking during recent years. Under these circumstances, the net result of T. V. Soong's fiscal reforms is to assure continued coupon payments on the bonds held by the Shanghai bankers. For the same reason, these critics argue, Nanking's reconstruction projects have not progressed beyond the blue-print stage. The partial remodeling of the city of Nanking, new airway lines and radio broadcasting stations, and a small amount of road-building comprise the sum-total of the government's actual achievements.⁶¹ Against these gains must be set the losses suffered through deterioration of railway equipment and road-beds, a progressive closing of schools in many provinces,⁶² and a general increase in the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of poppies for opium. The labor legislation of the Nanking government, it is contended, has proved inimical to the interests of the workers.⁶³ The arbitral procedure is designed to place legal restrictions in the way of effective strike action, the trade union act provides for governmental regulation so strict as to prevent the creation of organizations controlled by the workers,⁶⁴ and the factories act contains exceptions that have nullified increases in wages or reductions in hours of work. Genuinely radical efforts in behalf of the workers, particularly on the part of the Communists, have been met by a "white terror" of unprecedented brutality.⁶⁵ Finally, against the rendition of three concessions and the Weihaiwei leasehold must be set the loss of Manchuria.

CONCLUSION

The Kuomintang has assumed two contrasting rôles during the past decade. From late 1923 to the middle of 1927 it fulfilled a revolutionary function in behalf of the Chinese masses; since then it has buttressed the

61. Local and provincial efforts have accomplished much more along these lines, especially road-building, than has the central government. Cf. *New York Times*, December 4, 1932.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Cf. *China Forum* (Shanghai, May 1932), special edition, Vol. I, Nos. 11-12-13, p. 9-13.

58. Cf. *New York Times*, November 13, 1932.

59. Cf. Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia*, cited, p. 75. Imports rose slightly in 1930 over 1928, but the customs revenue (under the new rates) trebled.

60. As a result of the fiscal crisis that followed the Shanghai hostilities, however, the interest on the majority of Nanking's bond issues was slightly reduced and the amortization period was doubled. (Cf. *Memorandum on Chinese Government Issues*, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, September 30, 1932.)

64. Nanking's purpose, according to the Chinese assessor to the Lytton Commission, was to set up "purified" labor unions. Cf. V. K. Wellington Koo, *Memoranda presented to the Lytton Commission* (New York, The Chinese Cultural Society, 1932), Vol. II, p. 774.

65. *China Forum*, cited, p. 2-5.

control of capitalist elements in Chinese society. Capitalist domination of the Kuomintang, however, has not suppressed the issue thus raised. With the progress of the Chinese Communist movement, the choice between reconstructing China on a socialist or a capitalist basis is pressed more and more insistently on Chinese leaders. On which of these bases shall China seek to satisfy its supreme political necessities—national unification, stability, and security?

Supporters of the Nanking régime argue that the Chinese bourgeoisie constitutes the sole force in China today sufficiently powerful and cohesive to establish national unity. This group considers radical mass movements to be divisive and disruptive forces, and therefore suppresses them. It holds that the standard of living of the Chinese masses can rise only with an improvement in China's general economic condition. It seeks stability by utilizing its financial resources to set up a centralized government that will gradually bring the feudal militarists under control. For the achievement of security, it relies on economic pressure, on the world's peace machinery, and finally on China's military strength.

APPENDIX I. Statement by Madame Sun at Hankow in July 1927*

I feel that it is necessary at this time to explain, as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, that we have reached a point where definition is necessary and where some members of the party executive are so defining the principles and policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen that they seem to me to do violence to Dr. Sun's ideas and ideals. Feeling thus, I must dissociate myself from active participation in the carrying out of these new policies of the party. Today we face a crisis and we must probe searchingly into fundamental questions for fundamental answers. We must answer the questions of the nature of revolution in general, of the Chinese Revolution in particular, whether it is to be a mere political or a social revolution, and what changes are involved. In the last analysis, all revolutions must be social revolutions, based upon fundamental changes in society; otherwise they are merely changes of government.

To guide us in the Chinese Revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies. It is the Third Principle, that of the livelihood of the people, that is at stake at the present time—the principle that answers the questions of fundamental social changes in China. This Third Principle was felt by Dr. Sun to be basic in our Revolution. In this principle we find his analysis of social values and the place of the laboring and peasant classes defined. These classes become the basis of our strength in our struggle to overthrow imperialism, cancel the unequal treaties that enslave us, and effectively unify the country. These are the new pillars for the building up of a new free China. Without their support, the Kuomintang, as a revolutionary party, becomes weak, chaotic and illogical in its social platform; without their support, political issues are vague. If we adopt any policy that weakens these supports, we shake the very foundation of our party, betray the masses and are falsely loyal to our leader. Today there is much talk of policy. Dr. Sun defined three policies, which

Other Chinese leaders, like Madame Sun Yat-sen, contend that the Kuomintang must broaden its base of support until it again constitutes a revolutionary party devoted to the interests of the Chinese masses. They feel that national unity can be founded only on the organized strength of the peasants and workers. The attempt to solve China's basic problem of mass poverty, they argue, cannot be postponed; until this problem is faced, Chinese society will continue to be racked by grinding internal strife. They point to the fact that China's agrarian revolution—a product of the accumulated exactions of landlord, money-lender, and militarist—is already under way in the interior. In their view, militarism in China—the primary obstacle to stability—constitutes a chief means for the private accumulation of wealth; it can be eliminated only by establishing a governmental régime that is controlled by the Chinese masses in their own interest. Once this objective has been achieved, they feel that the united strength of the Chinese peasants and workers will secure China against foreign aggression as effectively as Russia's peasant-worker armies defended the Soviet Union during the intervention.

he decided were the only means by which his Three Principles could be carried out. But today it is being said that policies must be changed to fit the needs of the time. There is some truth in this statement, but change of policy should never be carried to a point where it becomes a reversal, so that a revolutionary party ceases to be revolutionary and becomes merely an organ, operating under the banner of revolution but actually working in support of the very social structure which the party was founded to alter.

At the moment we face critical issues. Theoretical and practical differences have arisen between various elements of the party. Drastic solutions are suggested. It is because I feel that the carrying out of some of these suggested solutions would destroy the strength of the party and delay the success of the Revolution that I must speak. These solutions seem to me a part of a policy which would alienate and suppress the classes upon which our strength largely depends and for which the Revolution must be fought. . . . We must not betray the people. We have built up in them a great hope. They have placed in us a great faith. To that faith we owe our final allegiance.

Dr. Sun came from the people. He has told me a great deal about his early days. He came from the peasantry. His father was a farmer and the people of his district were farmers. Dr. Sun was poor. Not until he was fifteen years old did he have shoes for his feet, and he lived in a hilly region where it is not easy to be a barefoot boy. His family, until he and his brother were grown, lived almost from hand to mouth, in a hut. As a child he ate the cheapest food—not rice, for rice was too dear; his main nourishment was sweet potatoes. Many times Dr. Sun has told me that it was in those days, as a poor son of a poor peasant family, that he became a revolutionary. He was determined that the lot of the Chinese peasant should not continue to be so wretched, that little boys in China should have shoes to wear and rice to eat. For this ideal he gave forty years of his life. Yet today the lot

*Chung Mei News Agency, July 27, 1927.

of the Chinese peasant is even more wretched than in those days when Dr. Sun was driven by his great sense of human wrongs into a life of revolution. And today men, who profess to follow his banner, talk of classes and think in terms of a "revolution" that would virtually disregard the sufferings of those millions of poverty-stricken peasants of China. Today also we hear condemnation of the peasant and labor movement as a recent, alien product. This is false. Twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of a revolution that would change the status of the Chinese peasant. In his early twenties he wrote to Li Hung-chang, petitioning for social and economic reforms. In 1911 he wrote an article on the agrarian question in China, printed in Geneva, in *The Socialist*, in which he said that the basis of social and economic transformation in China is an agrarian revolution. All his life this was one of the great goals he had in mind. Everything he planned he saw as a means to the betterment of the life of the Chinese masses. . . .

It is only in the past few years, after four decades of struggle, that these plans for a revolution of the people have begun to bear fruit. I remember clearly the first All Kwangtung Peasants' Conference in Canton, in July 1924. Then for the first time we saw the people of China, who must be her new strength, coming to participate in the Revolution. From all the districts of Kwangtung the peasants came, many of them walking miles and miles, barefooted, to Canton. They were ragged, tattered. Some carried baskets and poles. I remember I was deeply moved. Dr. Sun was moved also. When he reached home he said to me, "This is the beginning of the success of the revolution," and he told me again the part the oppressed people of China must play in their own salvation. All these years his purpose

was clear. But today we talk of recent foreign influence. Was Sun Yat-sen—the leader who was voicing the agrarian revolution for China when Russia was still under the heel of the Czar—was he the tool of foreign scheming? Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If leaders of the party do not carry them out consistently then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers, and the party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist. It will have ceased to be a living force working for the future welfare of the Chinese people, and will have become a machine, the agent of oppression, a parasite fattening on the present enslaving system!

We face a serious crisis. But it is more of a crisis for us as individuals than for China as a country. Whether the present Kuomintang at this moment rises to the height of its ideals and courageously finds a revolutionary corrective for its mistakes, or whether it slumps into the shamefulfulness of reaction and compromise, the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen will conquer in the end. Revolution in China is inevitable. At the moment I feel that we are turning aside from Dr. Sun's policy of leading and strengthening the people; therefore I must withdraw until wiser policies prevail. There is no despair in my heart for the Revolution. My disheartenment is only for the path into which some of those who had been leading the Revolution have strayed. But although there are members of the party who are straying from the path Dr. Sun charted for the Revolution of China, millions of people in China who have already come under the banners of the party will continue on this path to the final goal. This means that I shall not keep faith alone. I am certain that all true members of the Kuomintang will take this revolutionary path.

APPENDIX II. Madame Sun's Conversation with Tai Chi-tao* on August 10, 1929†

After some sentimental references, Tai stated that his health was poor and that he had sought to go abroad many times, and in fact was on the point of leaving for Europe last year, when the appeals of Chiang Kai-shek and his other friends to assist them in the reconstruction work of the country prevented him from carrying out his cherished plan. Tai added that he cared neither for money nor for position and had no other motive for joining the government than to bear his share of the responsibilities in the difficult tasks of the "party and the country." Sensing that Tai had come on a "mission" from Chiang and was trying to "break the news" to me, I cut it short by remarking that it indeed was a great pity that he had not succeeded in leaving the country. He became embarrassed and silent. However, his wife broke the silence by asking why I had not gone to Nanking yet. I replied: "Why should I go? The burial is over." Politely she continued: "It is so beautiful in the Ling Yuan and all the comforts are prepared in your residence there. We all wish to see you there and then you would be on the spot to advise the government." To which clever speech, I bluntly replied that I was not fitted for a politician's rôle. Besides, even at Shanghai I have no liberty of speech; it would be absurd to expect it in Nanking.

At this point, Tai straightened up from his seat, mumbled about having something to show me, and began fumbling in his pocket. Finally, a folded paper was extracted from his purse. He was about to hand it over to me when I assured him that it looked like a copy of my telegram to the Anti-Imperialist League which Nanking had suppressed from publication.

*Tai Chi-tao was chairman of the Examination Yuan at Nanking from 1928 to 1932. The interview is recorded by Madame Sun Yat-sen. Its publication was prohibited by the Nanking government.

†*China Tomorrow*, October 20, 1929, p. 162-165.

TAI: "Then it is really from you. I could hardly believe that! It is incredible for a person of your position to assume such an attitude. This is a very serious matter indeed!"

SOONG (MADAME SUN): "It is the only honest attitude and the one which Dr. Sun would take were he under the same circumstances. It was foolish of you to spread the rumor that my telegram was a forgery of the Communists, for I have it in my power to prove that every word of it was from me."

TAI: "The Communists have been responsible for all sorts of crimes. But how could you issue such a telegram attacking the government, especially at this time when the Communists are creating havoc all over the country, murdering, pillaging and burning, all under the direction of Moscow? It is a very grave offense that cannot be overlooked by the government, in spite of personal considerations. Even if the government had committed a mistake, you had no right to speak openly! You must abide by Party discipline. And the worst of it is the telegram is addressed to foreigners! It amounts to disgracing the government and the people, your own people!"

SOONG: "Regarding Party discipline, I do not belong to your 'party,' although I am 'indebted' to you for placing my name on your Central Executive Committee. Now you have the nerve to tell me that I have no right to speak! Did you put me on your Party Committee as a trade-mark then, to deceive the public? Your insinuations are insulting, but rest assured that no one considers the Nanking Government as representative of the Chinese people! I speak for the suppressed masses of China and you know it! The world can easily distinguish whether that 'foreign body' to which I addressed the telegram, is friendly or inimical to the interests of the Chinese nation and people. The Anti-Imperialist League to which you referred with such patriotic indignation, is working for the national independence

and the sovereignty of China. My telegram is a vindication of the honor of the Chinese! Your base surrender to the Japanese and foreign imperialists . . . has brought shame upon the country. . . . Is it not disgraceful for your agent, Yang Fu, to accuse me before the French police of having installed a secret wireless? Is it not disgraceful to set foreign spies against me? You have brought stains upon China's revolutionary history for which the masses of China will call you to account one day!"

TAI: "You are too impatient, Mrs. Sun. Revolution cannot be accomplished in one day. Instead of wasting your energies in destructive causes, in attacking the government and the leaders, it is your duty to cooperate with us. Your indignation and feelings, I can quite understand. They are the result of these last years of painful experience. But Dr. Sun was not an ordinary mortal. He was far superior to all human beings. Heaven endowed him with extraordinary wisdom and talents. His ideas are centuries in advance of the times. You surely must realize that the Three Principles cannot be hoped by any stretch of the imagination to be accomplished in a few generations. They must require three or four hundred years. Who can tell?"

SOONG: "Evidently you are now quoting from your modified Three Principles! Dr. Sun himself has declared that the revolution could be carried out successfully within 20 or 30 years if the members remained true to the cause. In fact when he drew up the program he formed them with the idea that they were to be accomplished within his own lifetime As a result of your ill health you have become very pessimistic. You are no longer the Tai Chi-tao of your youth, eager for revolution, for justice, for change. Inevitably you have become a Buddhist! But I must warn you against interpreting Dr. Sun as an idol, as another Confucius and Saint. It is insulting to Dr. Sun's memory, for he was ever a revolutionist in thought and in action! I am sorry, but your mind has degenerated!"

TAI: "On the contrary, my mind has progressed with the years. To better the social conditions, to reform the livelihood of the people, is this not revolutionary?"

SOONG: "The Kuomintang was created as a revolutionary organization. It was never meant to be a reformist society, otherwise it would be called the Reform Party."

TAI: "May I ask what is your idea of a revolutionist? There seem to be various definitions!"

SOONG: "One who is dissatisfied with the present system and works to create a new social order in its stead that will benefit society at large. And may I ask what your revolutionary achievements are?"

TAI: "Have you failed to notice the great progress made in every department of the government—the reconstruction that is going on, new buildings that are springing up to replace the rotten structures, new railway lines proposed that will transform the communications of the country and relieve the people's sufferings? You saw with your own eyes the grand Chung Shan Highway, for instance, at Nanking. Are these not worthy achievements, amidst difficult circumstances and obstacles confronting us?"

SOONG: "I have noticed nothing but the wanton killing of tens of thousands of revolutionary youths who would one day replace the rotten officials. Nothing but the hopeless misery of the people, nothing but the selfish struggling of the militarists for power, nothing but extortionate demands upon the already starving masses; in fact, nothing but counter-revolutionary activities. As regards your other achievements, the grand Chung Shan Highway—who is benefitted by it? Only you and those of you who ride about in motor cars and limousines. Do you never stop to think of those tens of thousands of miserable beings whom you have forced out of their

huts, their only shelter, in order to make way for your own convenience?"

TAI: "These are unreasonable accusations and absurd. Kindly tell me how one can reconstruct without tearing down rotten huts and structures?"

SOONG: "But reconstruct for whose benefit? Do you suppose for one moment that Dr. Sun organized the Kuomintang as a tool for the rich to get still richer and suck the blood of the starving millions of China? Was it for that he labored persistently for forty years?"

TAI: "Every human being possesses a conscience, it is not the monopoly of any single individual. As you know in philosophy . . ."

SOONG: "Please abstain from deep subjects, I only know facts."

TAI: "Then you demand that every one give up progress and return to the past, go on foot and give up motor cars, eh?"

SOONG: "I do not demand the absurd, but I do demand that you all stop raising your standard of living. It is already too luxurious, and a million times higher than the average person's. Militarists and officials, who a few years ago I knew to be poor, are suddenly parading about in fine limousines and buying up mansions in the Concessions for their newly-acquired concubines. I ask you, where did their money come from? Do you think that if Dr. Sun were living, he would approve of such a state of affairs? You cannot but admit, if you have a conscience left, that the Kuomintang has entirely lost its revolutionary significance."

TAI: "Why did you not make your opinions known when you first came back?"

SOONG: "Have not my opinions always been suppressed? But I did have the chance to express myself freely to your Chairman. If he kept my opinions to himself, the responsibility rests with him."

TAI: "Kai-shek is exerting himself to his utmost to carry out Dr. Sun's program. He has tremendous responsibilities on his shoulders, and there are overwhelming obstacles for him to overcome. It behooves all loyal comrades to assist him therein. But the situation is very difficult and complicated. Indeed, even if Kai-shek were to hand over the government to you or to Wang Ching-wei, I am certain that conditions would not improve in the least, if indeed they would not become worse."

SOONG: "Rest assured that I do not aspire to take the place of Mr. Chiang! However, it is only your personal opinion that conditions could not improve except in the hands of Chiang. The welfare of the country is not the monopoly or private property of any individual. *Therein lies your fundamental mistake!* As for carrying out the program of Dr. Sun, which part is it that Chiang and his assistants are carrying out? You have betrayed even his last injunctions, to which you render lip service every day! Do you start to awaken the masses by suppressing their voices, by suppressing meetings, by suppressing publications, by suppressing organizations?"

TAI: "Have you forgotten what happened in Hunan and Canton when the mass movement was on! Surely the horrors are still fresh in your memory! You have seen how liberty was abused! Only disorder and disturbance result from such meetings. The Chinese are centuries behind the times in this respect. Even among the Kuomintang members, who have already had some training, sometimes there is disorder and strife in the meetings How could you expect the ignorant and illiterate masses to hold meetings, much less to organize themselves? They must first undergo a proper period of tutelage!"

SOONG: "Do you know you are advancing the very arguments against your own countrymen which the imperialists employed against us in the case of our demand for the abolition of the unequal

treaties? They claim that we are centuries behind the times, and are ignorant of law and order and therefore cannot govern ourselves and therefore must 'undergo a proper period of tutelage!' How could you expect people to hold and organise meetings when you do not allow them the opportunity to practice . . . ? Is it possible to learn swimming without going into the water? Are you not inconsistent, Mr. Tai?"

TAI: "I am afraid that it is you who are inconsistent. You want to advance the cause of the people, to relieve their sufferings, yet you object to war against the enemies of the people, the rotten Kwangsi gang and other militarists such as Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, who are the obstacles in the path of revolution!"

SOONG: "What benefits do the people reap from wars between rival militarists except increased taxation, oppression and the loss of lives?"

TAI: "You evidently desire peace then, and yet you begin by creating dissensions and attacking those who are working for the country and the people! Let us now listen to each other's opinions. We will listen to you, but you also must listen to the majority."

APPENDIX III. Statement by Madame Sun at Shanghai on December 19, 1931*

It is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Kuomintang as a political power has ceased to exist. It has been liquidated not by its opponents outside the party, but by its own leaders within the party. With the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Peiping in 1925, the national revolution suddenly lost its leadership and broke midway to its completion. The party comrades in Canton at that time, however, adhered strictly to his doctrine by which the masses were made the foundation of the revolution, enabling the Northern Expedition to be successful in the Yangtze Valley within a short period of time. But soon after came the split between Nanking and Wuhan, caused by the personal dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and mutual conflicts among militarists and politicians, deepening the gulf between the party and the people daily. The Revolution was driven underground by frightful slaughter and terrorism. Using anti-communism as a screen for its treachery, the Kuomintang continued its reactionary activities. In the central government, party members strove for the highest and most lucrative posts, forming personal cliques to fortify their positions, while in their local districts they likewise exploited the masses to satisfy their personal greed. By allying themselves with one militarist after another, they have been able to jump to high positions in the party and government. But faithful and true revolutionaries have been deliberately tortured to death in many cruel ways, the latest example of which is the murder of Teng Yen-ta. . . .

Recently came the split between the Nanking and Canton factions, forming two conflicting forces. . . . Since Japan's open invasion of Manchuria, both the Canton and Nanking cliques, facing the national crisis and public criticism, have been forced temporarily to cease fighting openly, and have held a so-called peace and unification conference. Three months were spent in intriguing around this conference, and the kernel of their debates has been a division of spoils in the Central Party Committees and the government. Of the abject misery and desperate needs of peasants and workers, who form the overwhelming majority of the nation, not one word was uttered in this conference. These rival cliques are completely blinded by self-interest to the fact that personal dictatorship, demoralization of the party and partition of the country by foreign imperialists have all resulted from the gulf created by

SOONG: "I have no illusions either as to peace, which is found only in the grave, or to your persuasions, which are wasted on me."

TAI: "Why couldn't you come to Nanking for a while? You will have the pleasant company of your family members and will be happier there amidst such surroundings. We are all human beings and entertain goodwill and sympathy for each other."

SOONG: "If happiness were my object, I would not return to painful scenes to witness the burial of our hopes and sacrifices, and I prefer to sympathize with masses rather than with individuals."

TAI: "I hope that you will not make any more statements, Mrs. Sun."

SOONG: "There is only one way to silence me, Mr. Tai—shoot me or imprison me. If you don't, then it simply means that you admit you are not wrongly accused. But whatever you do, do it openly like me, don't resort to underhanded tactics and again surround me with spies."

TAI: "I shall call again upon my return from Nanking."

SOONG: "Further conversations would be useless—the gulf between us is too wide."

themselves between the Kuomintang and the masses. Only a party that is built on the basis of a worker and peasant policy can establish a foundation for socialism, break the power of militarism and throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism. If "peace" and "unification" go smoothly, whereby each clique gets all it wants, "peace" will mean nothing except a peaceful division of the spoils, and "unity" will mean nothing but a united looting of the masses. It is utterly unthinkable that the masses of China should have any interest in such a "peace," or the nation should desire such a "unity."

We are now witnessing the first fruits of this "unification" in Nanking. Only three days ago, by the order of the imperialist ministers, the "United" Government tried to suppress the patriotic student movement. In less than 12 hours, soldiers and gangsters surrounded the students, brutally beating and bayonetting them, and driving them out of the city like beasts. Many students were injured and killed; a great number are reported "missing." Such an atrocity has been staged at the very moment when a foreign imperialist army is advancing on Chin-chow, and when all traitors and imperialists are honored, flattered and protected. This has been carried out following the arrival at Nanking of men who have been promising "revolutionary diplomacy," "national democracy," "free speech, press and assembly". . . .

I, for one, cannot bear to witness the work of 40 years by Sun Yat-sen being destroyed by a handful of self-seeking and scheming Kuomintang militarists and politicians. Still more unbearable is it for me to see the subjection of a nation of 400,000,000 to imperialism, brought about by the Kuomintang's betrayal of its own doctrine. I, therefore, am compelled to declare frankly, that since the Kuomintang was organized as a machine for the revolution, and since it failed to carry out the tasks for which it was created, we need express no sorrow for its downfall. I firmly believe that only a revolution built on mass support and for the masses can break the power of militarists, of politicians, and throw off the yoke of foreign imperialism and truly realise socialism. I am convinced that, despite the terroristic activities carried on by the reactionary forces in power today, millions of true revolutionaries in China will not shrink from their duty, but, urged by the critical situation facing the country, will intensify their work and march on triumphantly toward the goal set by the revolution.

*The People's Tribune, December 26, 1931, p. 46-48.